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DELAWARE & HUDSON REVISITED
John Copeland Nagle*
Four score and eight years ago, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,' a little remembered case hold-
ing that a federal statute prohibited railroads from shipping coal that
they own across state lines. The statute at issue-the Commodities
Clause of the Hepburn Act-seemed to bar any railroad company
from transporting any article that it had produced,2 but a group of
Pennsylvania railroads objected that the statute violated numerous
provisions of the Constitution. The Court dodged those constitu-
tional questions by reading the Act narrowly to apply only if the rail-
road still owned the coal at the time of shipment. Justice Edward
White defended this approach by explaining that "where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such ques-
tions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter."3
That canon of statutory interpretation has long survived Delaware
& Hudson. But instead of Justice White, it is Justice Brandeis who
most often gets the credit for the rule as he restated it in his famous
concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.4 Judge
Friendly once wrote that questioning the Ashwander principle "is
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. BA. Indiana
University 1982; J.D. University of Michigan Law School 1986. I am grateful to Abner
Greene for his comments, to Lowell Sturgill for his help, and to Howard Benard and
Steve Skinner for their research assistance. My apologies for not finishing this article
last year.
1 213 U.S. 366 (1909).
2 See Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
3 Delaware & Hudson, 213 U.S. at 408 (citation omitted).
4 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("When the validity of an
act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutional-
ity is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932))). For a recent illustration of the
endurance of Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Ashwander, see Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1074 (1997), which cites Ashwander twice for this
principle.
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rather like challenging Holy Writ" 5-but he did so anyway, and so
have such eminences as Harry Wellington, Richard Posner, and
Antonin Scalia. 6 Now Frederick Schauer has suggested abandoning
the principle altogether. In Ashwander Revisited,7 Schauer contends
that the rule is "triply problematic": first, because it disguises the fact
that a court actually makes a constitutional decision by the very act of
determining that the rule applies; second, because legislators equate a
judicial decision avoiding a constitutional question with a judicial
holding of unconstitutionality; and third, because courts invoke the
rule without really analyzing the pending constitutional issue.8 When
these costs are balanced against the presumed benefits of avoiding
constitutional decisions, Schauer suggests that the rule comes out well
behind.9
I agree with much of what Schauer so forcefully argues, but he
has told only half of the story. Ashwander is not to blame. In fact,
neither the Court nor Justice Brandeis had any occasion in Ashwander
to consider whether the Tennessee Valley Authority Act needed to
receive a different interpretation to render it constitutional. The true
culprit is Delaware & Hudson, where Justice White stated two different
rules in his opinion. The second rule that he stated-the rule quoted
above, and questioned by Schauer and others-can be termed the
"doubts" canon because it directs a court to interpret a statute to avoid
any constitutional doubts about the law. The other rule-what I will
call the "unconstitutionality" canon-instructs that "if the statute be
reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it would
be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain duty to adopt
that construction which will save the statute from constitutional
infirmity."10
The most noticeable difference between the two rules is that the
unconstitutionality canon requires a court to decide the constitutional
question while the doubts canon allows a court to avoid any such deci-
5 HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 210 (1967).
6 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 314 n.9 (1993) (Scalia, J.) (characterizing the
rule as "the last refuge of many an interpretive lost cause"); RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS CRISIS AND REFORM 284-85 (1985); Harry H. Wellington, Machinists
v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961 Sup. CT.
REv. 49, 67-71. For the most recent critique of the principle, see Lisa A. Kiop-
penberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Stat-
utes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1 (1996).
7 Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 71.
8 See id. at 89.
9 See id. at 97 (discussing the results of scrapping the principle in its entirety); id.
at 98 (contending that "[Il]ittle would be lost by abandoning Ashwander entirely").
10 United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909).
1496 [VOL- 72:5
Delaware & Hudson REVISITED
sion. That is why Delaware & Hudson invoked the doubts canon, not
the unconstitutionality canon. Justice White followed his recitation of
the unconstitutionality canon, and preceded his statement of the
doubts canon, with this sentence:
And unless this rule be considered as meaning that our duty is to first
decide that a statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that
such ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a
meaning, which causes it not to be repugnant to the Constitution, the
rule plainly must mean... [that constitutional doubts alone suffice to
interpret a statute differently.] "1
That is the claim I want to put to rest in this Article. Before Dela-
ware & Hudson, courts routinely interpreted statutes to avoid holding
them unconstitutional. A court first decided that a statute was uncon-
stitutional, and then the court proceeded to adopt an interpretation
of the statute that avoided the constitutional 'problem altogether-the
exact approach thatJustice White rejected out of hand. In fact, I have
located only a few decisions invoking the doubts canon before Dela-
ware & Hudson was decided.' 2 Thus Justice White's assertion that the
unconstitutionality canon "plainly must mean" the doubts canon is
both historically and logically false. Nonetheless, courts since Delaware
& Hudson have employed the more prudential doubts canon. Justice
White's fear of unnecessary constitutional adjudication found a
clearer voice in Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in Ashwander,
which listed the doubts canon as one of several devices by which a
court can avoid deciding a difficult constitutional question.' 3 And the
doubts canon has carried the day. Cases such as Rust v. SullivanI4 and
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop'5 divided the Court because of disputes about
when to interpret a statute simply because it raises constitutional
doubts, without deciding whether those doubts were ultimately justi-
11 Id. at 408.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 68-72.
13 The seven rules instruct the Court (1) not to decide the constitutionality of
legislation in a friendly, non-adversarial proceeding; (2) not to anticipate a constitu-
tional question before the necessity of deciding it; (3) not to formulate rules of consti-
tutional law broader than what is needed to decide the particular case; (4) to decide
cases on non-constitutional grounds if possible; (5) not to decide the constitutionality
of a statute if the party has not been injured by that statute; (6) not to decide the
constitutionality of a statute if the party has benefited from the statute; and (7) to
interpret a statute, if fairly possible, to avoid serious constitutional doubts. See Ash-
wander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
14 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
15 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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fled. By contrast, applications of the "uncon-stitutionality" rule since
Delaware & Hudson are much harder to find.16
Now the doubts canon is under siege from Schauer and others.
The unconstitutionality canon offers another approach to statutory in-
terpretation and to constitutional adjudication. It has its own
problems, of course, which demand serious attention before it is res-
urrected today. But since Schauer has so effectively questioned the
doubts canon, it may be time to consider the work that the unconstitu-
tionality canon can do that the doubts canon cannot. That requires
an investigation of the judicial practice before Ashwander, before Dela-
ware & Hudson, and in state and federal constitutional decisions lost
in the mists of the nineteenth century.
I. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY CANON BEFORE DELA WARE &HUDSON
The unconstitutionality canon appeared in decisions throughout
the nineteenth century. The typical expression of the canon-like
that stated but not applied in Delaware & Hudson-instructed a court
confronted with two alternative interpretations of a statute to adopt
the interpretation that was not unconstitutional.' 7 In its more color-
16 See, e.g., Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 943 F. Supp.
975 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (interpreting an Indiana campaign finance statute to not cover
groups that only engage in "issue advocacy" so that the statute would not be held
unconstitutional under Buckey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)); Boaden v. Department of
Law Enforcement, 664 N.E.2d 61, 66 (Ill. 1996) (Freeman,J., concurring) (interpret-
ing "marital status" narrowly to avoid holding the Illinois Human Rights Act unconsti-
tutional); Ohio v. Linner, 665 N.E.2d 1180, 1184 (Hamilton Mun. Ct. 1996)
(interpreting Ohio's domestic violence statute to apply to violence between homosex-
uals in order to avoid holding the statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause); Texas ex. reL Angelini v. Hardberger, 932 S.W.2d 489, 499 (Tex. 1996)
(Baker, J., dissenting) (interpreting the Texas election code to avoid "the conclusion
that the Legislature intended to unconstitutionally" allow an officeholder to deter-
mine his or her successor, contrary to the governor's appointment power).
17 See, e.g., Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895); Miller v. United States,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 309 (1870); United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 76
(1838); Kelley v. Great N. Ry. Co., 152 F. 211, 229 (C.C.D. Minn. 1907); Marvin v.
Maysville St. R.R. & Transfer Co., 49 F. 436, 438 (C.C.D. Ky. 1892); St. Louis Nat'l
Bank v. Papin, 21 F. Cas. 203, 205 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876) (No. 12,239); Singer Mfg. Co.
v. M'Collock, 24 F. 667, 668 (E.D. Ark. 1884); Huggins v. Ball, 19 Ala. 587, 589 (1851);
Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Glover, 110 S.W. 1031, 1033 (Ark. 1908);
Cheeseborough v. City & County of S.F., 96 P. 288, 291 (Cal. 1908); People v. Frisbie,
26 Cal. 135, 139 (1864); French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518, 554 (1864); Park v.
Candler, 39 S.E. 89, 95-96 (Ga. 1901); Robson v. Doyle, 61 N.E. 435, 437 (Ill. 1901);
Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376, 384 (1857); Duncombe v. Prindle, 12 Iowa 1, 8 (1861);
Conner v. Kentucky, 76 Ky. 714, 722 (1878); Grinage v. Times-Democrat Publ'g Co.,
31 So. 682, 683 (La. 1902); Massachusetts v. Intoxicating Liquors, 52 N.E. 389, 390
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ful form, the canon commanded that "[t]hat construction must ob-
tain which would give [the statute] constitutional life, rather than
another construction, of which it might be susceptible, which would
strike it with constitutional death."' However stated, the canon was
firmly established well before the advent of the twentieth century. 19
This was not idle rhetoric. The courts stating the unconstitution-
ality canon routinely applied that rule just as its terms would suggest.
Thus, a court would announce that because interpretation x of a stat-
ute was unconstitutional, interpretation y should be adopted instead.
In sharp contrast to the doubts canon, courts applying the unconstitu-
tionality canon actually decided the constitutional question before
turning to the constitutionally safe interpretation. Because this is the
very course that Delaware & Hudson found implausible, I want to pause
to describe how the canon actually operated in a number of those
cases.
(1) Several free blacks were original shareholders in the Citizens'
Bank of Louisiana. M4ter the bank was established, the state legisla-
ture amended its charter to prohibit anyone who was not a "free white
citizen" of the United States from owning any stock in the bank. The
leaders of the bank then refused to consider the blacks as valid share-
holders. The court responded that
(Mass. 1899); Commonwealth v. People's Five Cents Sav. Bank, 87 Mass. 428, 432
(1862); Grand Rapids Booming Co. v.Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308, 323 (1874); Sykes v. Mayor
& Aldermen, 55 Miss. 115, 144 (1877); Cass Countyv. Sarpy County, 92 N.W. 635, 636
(Neb. 1902); Dow v. True Norris, 4 N.H. 16, 18 (1827); West Jersey Traction Co. v.
Camden Horse R.R. Co., 29 A. 333, 339 (N.J. Ch. 1894); Atlantic City Water-Works
Co. v. Consumers' Water Co., 15 A. 581, 586 (NJ. Ch. 1888); Colwell v. May's Landing
Water Power Co., 19 NJ. Eq. 245 (1868); State Water Supply Comm'n v. Curtis, 85
N.E. 148, 152 (N.Y. 1908); Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 39 N.E. 686, 688
(N.Y. 1895); Staudacher v. Webb, 23 Hun. 42, 46 (N.Y. 1878); Metropolitan Bd. of
Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657, 669 (1866); Commissioners v. Ballard, 69 N.C. 16, 17
(1873); Anderson v. Brewster, 9 N.E. 683, 685 (Ohio 1887); Pennsylvania ex reL Wolfe
v. Butler, 99 Pa. 535, 540 (1882); Pennsylvania ex rel. Rogers v. Bennett, 16 Serg. &
Rawle 243, 244 (Pa. 1827); Hayes v. Clinkscales, 9 S.C. 441, 452 (1877); Tennessee ex
rel. Morrell v. Fickle, 71 Tenn. 79, 81 (1879); Coleman v. Yesler, 1 Wash. Terr. 591,
594 (1879); Palms v. Shawano Co., 21 N.W. 77, 79 (Wis. 1884); see also Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.) (as-
serting that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains").
18 Grinage v. Times-Democrat Publ'g Co., 31 So. 682, 683 (La. 1902).
19 See People ex relJohnson v. Peacock, 98 M1l. 172, 177 (1881) (describing the
unconstitutionality canon as a "well recognized principle"); Bigelow v. West Wis. Ry.
Co., 27 Wis. 479, 486 (1871) (stating that the unconstitutionality canon "requires
neither argument nor reference to authorities").
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[i]f this [statute] be susceptible of two interpretations, we consider
ourselves bound to give it that which would not involve the destruc-
tion of a vested right, the impairing of an obligation, because if that
were its clear import, we should be compelled to say that it is uncon-
stitutional and void.20
Instead, the court concluded that the legislature intended the statu-
tory amendment to apply prospectively, "leaving the rights of all who
were at that time shareholders unimpaired."2 1
(2) The California Constitution provided that all property-in-
cluding stock-shall be taxed in proportion to its assessed value. Sec-
tion 3608 of the California Political Code stated:
Shares of stock in corporations possess no intrinsic value over and
above the actual value of the property of the corporation which they
stand for and represent; and the assessment and taxation of such
shares, and also all the corporate property, would be double taxa-
tion. Therefore, all property belonging to corportions... shall be
assessed and taxed. But no assessment shall be made of shares of
stock in any corporation .... 22
When an estate challenged the state's taxation of stock, the court as-
serted that an interpretation of section 3608 that exempted stock
from taxation even if the corporation's property had not been taxed
in California would be unconstitutional. 23 Therefore, the court read
section 3608 to subject the stock to taxation.
(3) An 1846 New Jersey statute authorizing the construction of
dams provided for the payment of damages caused by the erection of
a dam, but it did not provide for compensation for other losses caused
by a dam. Because the failure to provide just compensation "would
therefore be clearly against the constitution... this construction will
not be given."24 Instead, the court interpreted the statute to authorize
compensation for injuries that an upstream user would suffer if a
downstream dam flooded his property.
(4) The North Carolina Constitution prohibited race discrimina-
tion. Black residents of Kernersvile, North Carolina objected that a
1905 statute authorizing a grade school in the town was being used to
establish a school for whites only. The court indicated that the statute
20 Boisdere v. Citizens' Bank, 29 Am. Dec. 453, 455 (La. 1836).
21 Id. at 456.
22 Cheeseborough v. City & County of S.F., 96 P. 288, 289 (Cal. 1908).
23 Id. at 291.
24 Colwell v. The May's Landing Water Power Co., 19 NJ. Eq. 245, 249 (1868).
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would be unconstitutional if interpreted in that manner, so the court
read the law to establish a school district that included both races.2 5
(5) An 1865 Mississippi statute established an exclusive ferry
franchise and directed that "no person, except the railroad, shall be
permitted to transport any person, animal or property" across a sec-
tion of the Mississippi River near Vicksburg. William Grimes contin-
ued to transport materials across the river despite the exclusive
franchise held by Charles Marshall. The court said that the statute
would be unconstitutional if it "deprive[d] an individual of the right
to take himself or his personal property in his own vessel, or in that of
another, whether used for public or private business; provided such
boat was not kept and used for the purpose of a ferry-boat."26 The
court thus read the statute's general prohibition on "any person"
more narrowly to avoid invalidating the statute.
(6) In 1867, Sylvester Van Horn subscribed to two shares of a
railroad's stock and declared that he had paid ten percent down as
required by an 1850 New York railroad statute. In fact, he did not pay
any money down, so his stock purchase was invalid under the statute.
An 1869 statute, however, waived the down payment requirement and
further provided that no subscription to the railroad's stock shall be
invalidated for failure to pay ten percent down. Van Horn thus ar-
gued that his stock purchase was valid. The court disagreed, reason-
ing that the 1869 statute should not be interpreted to create a binding
contract where none existed before because such a reading would be
"in direct conflict with the constitutional provision that 'no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.'" 27 To avoid that result, the court interpreted the 1869 statute
prospectively, with the effect of invalidating Van Horn's purchase.
(7) The Georgia Constitution directed that the proceeds of the
sale of railroads by the state could only be applied to the state's debt.
An 1897 statute authorized the state treasurer "to draw on any funds
in the state treasury to the amount of $400,000, to be used in paying
the teachers as provided by law, and for other purposes." The court
concluded that it would be unconstitutional to pay teachers from the
railroad proceeds, and therefore, the phrase "any funds in the state
treasury" must "mean any funds in the treasury which can be lawfully
applied to the purposes indicated in the acts."28
25 Lowery v. Board of Graded Sch. Trustees, 52 S.E. 267, 269-70 (N.C. 1905).
Alas, the state constitution also mandated that "the schools be separated and the chil-
dren of each race be taught in a separate school." Id. at 270.
26 Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 27, 31 (1866).
27 New York & Oswego Midland R.R. Co. v. Van Horn, 57 N.Y. 473, 477 (1874).
28 Park v. Candler, 39 S.E. 89, 95-96 (Ga. 1901).
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(8) A statute enacted by the Texas Congress in 1837 authorized
"any person from whom property was wrongfully taken, to sue out for
an attachment" to recover the property. The preamble to the statute
recited that "many Mexicans residing in our frontier stole and drove
off large herds of cattle, and took and carried off other property be-
longing to the citizens of the Republic," and that "those Mexicans
have abandoned the co'untry and removed beyond the Rio Grande, so
that persons from whom they have taken property are wholly without
remedy." Fernando DeLeon argued that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it applied to Mexicans alone. The court agreed that "if
the preamble was substantially carried into the enacting part of the
statute, and we should construe it to mean Mexican citizens of Texas,"
the statute would be unconstitutional.2 9 But, the court added, "the
more reasonable construction would be to refer it to such Mexicans as
adhered to the enemy," which would render the statute
constitutional. 30
(9) An Alabama statute authorized the executor of an estate to
obtain an order from the probate court to settle the debts on the de-
cedent. When Martha McCalley died, her husband obtained such an
order from the probate court in his capacity as the executor of her
estate, but her children objected to the use of their inheritance to
satisfy the debts. The court opined that if the statute was construed to
authorize ex parte orders without notice to the31 The court thus in-
terpreted the statute to require compliance with the demands of due
process, and it remanded to the probate court for a determination of
whether such compliance had occurred.
(10) A train sparked a fire which burned a farmer's hay. Under
the majority common law rule, the railroad would not be liable unless
the plaintiff could establish some act of negligence. The Colorado
territorial legislature, however, reversed that rule in a statute provid-
ing "[t] hat every railroad corporation operating its line of road, or any
part thereof, in this state shall be liable for all damages by fire that is
set out or caused by operating any such line of road."32 The railroad
complained that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause it discriminated against corporations that operated railroads.
The court disagreed because the statutory term "railroad corporation"
could be read "to mean any body, company or association of persons,
whether technically incorporated or not, engaged in the operation of
29 Sutherland v. DeLeon, 1 Tex. 250, 303 (1846).
30 Id.
31 Wilburn & Co. v. McCalley, 63 Ala. 436, 444 (1879).
32 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. DeBusk, 20 P. 752, 755 (Colo. 1889).
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railroads."3 3 The court adopted this construction to avoid the equal
protection objection that had caused a federal court to strike down a
similar California statute.34
(11) Finally, on April 11, 1903, the Cincinnati Post reported that
the famous sharpshooter Annie Oakley had been arrested for robbery
and that she was a drug addict. A day later, the newspaper retracted
that story and explained that "Annie Oakley in private life is Mrs.
Frank Butler, and she is living peacefully in Nutley, N.J."3 5 Notwith-
standing the retraction, Butler sued for libel and received a verdict for
$2,500. The newspaper challenged the award on the basis of an Ohio
statute that eliminated the presumption of malice accompanying a
slanderous statement provided that "the publisher, upon demand and
within a reasonable time thereafter, published a full and complete re-
traction in as public a manner as that in which said original publica-
tion was made."36 Butler insisted that the statute did not apply
because she had not sought a retraction. She argued that the statute
would be unconstitutional if it were interpreted to allow a publisher to
escape liability by publishing an unrequested retraction because the
Ohio Constitution guaranteed all injured persons a legal remedy.37
The court held that the newspaper's interpretation of the statute as
allowing a unilateral retraction violated the Ohio Constitution, and
therefore, it read the statute to provide a libeled party with a choice of
a legal remedy or a retraction, as Butler had proposed.
In each of these cases, and others like them,38 the courts decided
that one interpretation of a statute would render it unconstitutional,
33 Id. at 757.
34 See id. at 756-57; see also County of San Mateo v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 13 F.
722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (invalidating the California statute).
35 Post Publ'g Co. v. Butler, 137 F. 723, 724 (6th Cir. 1905).
36 Id. at 725.
37 See id. (citing Onio CONST. art. I, § 16) ("All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law; and justice administered without denial or delay.").
38 See, e.g., Sohn v. Waterson, 84 U.S. 596 (1873) (interpreting a Kansas statute of
limitations act prospectively to avoid holding it unconstitutional); Alexander v.
Gordon, 101 F. 91, 98 (8th Cir. 1900) (interpreting an Arkansas statute of limitations
narrowly to avoid holding it unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause); Huggins
v. Ball, 19 Ala. 587 (1851) (interpreting an Alabama statute authorizing a sheriff to
bring certain actions to avoid holding it unconstitutional); Harrison v. Colgan, 82 P.
674, 676 (Cal. 1905) (interpreting a California statute establishing judicial salaries as
not applying to current judges in order to avoid a conflict with a state constitutional
provision); People v. Frisbie, 26 Cal. 135, 139-40 (1864) (interpreting a California
statute authorizing the reopening ofjudgments to avoid holding it unconstitutional);
Newland v. Marsh, 19 11M. 376, 381-86 (1857) (interpreting an Illinois law prohibiting
ejectment actions as operating prospectively only to avoid an unconstitutional retroac-
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and only then did they adopt an alternative interpretation. Other de-
cisions applying the unconstitutionality canon determined that inter-
pretation x was constitutional, and therefore, that interpretation
could be adopted instead of the less obvious interpretation y. For ex-
ample, an 1825 federal statute made it a crime to steal from a ship that
was in distress within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction of the
United States.3 9 Lawrence Coombs was indicted for stealing a variety
of goods from the Bristol, a ship that was stranded near Rockaway
Beach, New York.40 He argued that the statute did not apply to goods
tive application); Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County, 21 Iowa 221, 226-27 (1866)
(interpreting an Iowa taxation statute to treat individuals and corporations equally in
order to satisfy a state constitutional requirement); Duncombe v. Prindle, 12 Iowa 1,
7-9 (1860) (interpreting a statute establishing the boundaries of several Iowa counties
in order to avoid a violation of a state constitutional provision mandating a minimum
county size); Conner v. Kentucky, 76 Ky. 714, 720-22 (1878) (interpreting a Kentucky
murder statute to avoid a violation of the state constitutional requirements for the
definition of criminal offenses); Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322, 323-26 (1867) (Cooley,
J.) (interpreting a Michigan quiet title statute as permitting jury trials in order to
avoid violating the right to jury trials guaranteed by the state constitution); Cass
County v. Sarpy County, 92 N.W. 635, 636 (Neb. 1902) (interpreting a Nebraska stat-
ute governing bridge repairs to avoid holding it unconstitutional); Atlantic City
Water-Works Co. v. Consumers' Water Co., 15 A. 581, 586 (NJ. 1888) (interpreting a
NewJersey statute authorizing the establishment of water supply corporations to allow
competing franchises in order to avoid a violation of the state constitutional prohibi-
tion on special legislation); Hayes v. Clinkscales, 9 S.C. 441, 449-54 (1878) (interpret-
ing a South Carolina statute limiting contract enforcement actions to apply
prospectively only in order to avoid an unconstitutional impairment of contracts and
unconstitutional retroactive legislation); Martin v. South Salem Land Co., 33 S.E. 600,
601-02 (Va. 1899) (broadly interpreting the term "final decree on merits" in a Vir-
ginia statute depriving equity courts ofjurisdiction over certain securities cases in or-
der to avoid an unconstitutional interference with the judicial power).
39 See Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 65, § 9, 4 Stat. 116 (1825)
[I]f any person or persons shall plunder, steal, or destroy, any money, goods,
merchandise, or other effects, from or belonging to any ship or vessel, or
boat, or raft, which shall be in distress, or which shall be wrecked, lost,
stranded, or case away, upon the sea, or upon any reef, shoal, bank, or rocks,
of the sea, or in any other place within the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion of the United States
that person or persons shall be guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of $5,000 and
ten years imprisonment. Id.
40 To be precise, Coombs allegedly stole "one trunk of the value of five dollars,
one package of yarn of the value of five dollars, one package of silk of the value of five
dollars, one roll of ribbons of the value of five dollars, one package of muslin of the
value of five dollars, and six pairs of the value of five dollars." United States v.
Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 74 (1838). Rockaway Beach yielded an even more memorable
case nearly a century later. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.
1928).
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stolen from ships like the Bristol that were stranded above the high
water mark. Justice Story agreed that the Admiralty Clause did not
authorize jurisdiction above the high water mark, but he also con-
cluded that the Commerce Clause did authorize such jurisdiction.
With the statute's constitutionality established, the Court interpreted
the statute to apply to ships above the high water mark.41
Both sets of cases involve the resolution of a constitutional chal-
lenge before determining the appropriate interpretation of a statute.
That unifying theme cannot be explained away by the nature of the
constitutional objections at issue. The types of constitutional objec-
tions that justified a different reading of a statute included due pro-
cess,42 state single-subject rules,43 retroactivity,44 takings of property
withoutjust compensation, 45 qualifications for office,46 and equal pro-
tection.47 More importantly, these constitutional issues were previ-
ously undecided by the courts. If a constitutional question has already
been decided, then there is little to be gained by avoiding that ques-
tion, which suggests one possible justification for invoking the uncon-
stitutionality canon. But that was not the case with these nineteenth
century decisions. Few decisions cited any precedent for their conclu-
sion that a certain interpretation of a statute would render it unconsti-
tutional.48 Nor was the answer to the constitutional question so
obvious that a court was adding little by saying so. Under these cir-
41 See Coombs, 37 U.S. at 79-83.
42 SeeAlexanderv. Gordon, 101 F. 91,98 (8th Cir. 1900); Wilburn & Co. v. McCal-
ley, 63 Ala. 436, 443-44 (1879); Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Glover, 110 S.W.
1031, 1033 (Ark. 1908); Camp v. Rogers, 44 Conn. 291, 296-97 (1877); New York &
Oswego Midland R.R. Co. v. Van Horn, 57 N.Y. 473, 477 (1874).
43 See County of Cherokee v. Kansas, 13 P. 558, 558-59 (Kan. 1887); Tennessee ex
rel. Morrell v. Fickle, 71 Tenn. 79, 82-86 (1879); Slack v.Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612, 640-54
(1875).
44 See Middleport v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 82 Ill. 562, 566 (1876); Newland v. Marsh,
19 Ill. 376, 384-85 (1857); Boisdere v. Citizens' Bank, 29 Am. Dec. 453, 455-56 (La.
1836); Dow v. True Norris, 4 N.H. 16 (1827); New York & Oswego Midland RP, Co., 57
N.Y. at 476-78; Hayes v. Clinkscales, 9 S.C. 441, 451-54 (1877).
45 See State Water Supply Comm'n v. Curtis, 85 N.E. 148, 151-52 (N.Y. 1908);
Beckwith v. Beckwith, 22 Ohio St. 180, 188 (1871); Bigelow v. West Wis. Ry. Co., 27
Wis. 479, 486-87 (1871).
46 See McComas v. Krug, 81 Ind. 327, 331-34 (1882).
47 See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. De Busk, 20 P. 752, 755-59 (Colo. 1889); Lowery v.
Board of Graded Sch. Trustees, 52 S.E. 267, 269-70 (N.C. 1905).
48 For cases that did cite previous judicial authority on the constitutional ques-
tion, see, for example, PostPublg Co. v. Butler, 137 F. 723, 725-27 (6th Cir. 1905), Road
Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Cover, 110 S.W. 1031, 1033 (Ark. 1908), Union Pac. Ry. Co., 20
P. at 755-59, Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 332, 325 (1867), and New York & Oswego Midland
1R. Co., 57 N.Y. at 477.
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cumstances, the unconstitutionality canon cannot be distinguished as
a special rule for certain easy constitutional questions.
The statutory language that was interpreted according to the un-
constitutionality canon displays a similar diversity. The level of ambi-
guity that would allow for another interpretation-and conversely, the
level of statutory clarity that precluded another interpretation-was
described differently in different cases. The courts agreed that a stat-
ute must be susceptible of two interpretations before the unconstitu-
tionality canon could be applied.49 Conversely, courts refused to
apply the unconstitutionality canon to an unambiguous statute.50
Also, using the unconstitutionality canon to read a statute to avoid
holding it unconstitutional meant that the courts rejected the statute's
most natural reading-the unconstitutional one-in favor of an alter-
native interpretation. 51 Beyond those basic commands, courts went to
49 See Cheeseborough v. City & County of S.F., 96 P. 288, 291 (Cal. 1908); Park v.
Candler, 39 S.E. 89, 96 (Ga.1901); Conner v. Kentucky, 76 Ky. 714, 722 (1878); Bois-
dere, 29 Am. Dec. at 455; Cass County v. Sarpy County, 92 N.W. 635, 636 (Neb. 1902);
State Water Supply Comm'n, 85 N.E. at 152; Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 39
N.E. 686, 688 (N.Y. 1895); Palms v. Shawano, 21 N.W. 77, 79 (Wis. 1884); Attorney
Gen. v. City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400, 438 (1875).
50 See, e.g., Howard v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 463, 501 (1908); Miller v.
United States, 78 U.S. 268, 310 (1870); Maysville St. R.R. & Transfer Co. v. Marvin, 59
F. 91, 95 (6th Cir. 1893); French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518, 554 (1864); Sutherland
v. DeLeon, 1 Tex. 250, 304 (1846); Bacon v. Locke, 83 P. 721, 723 (Wash. 1906);
Palms, 21 N.W. at 79; see also HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUC-
TION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 115 (2d ed. 1911) ("Where the language is not
ambiguous, and the meaning is dear and obvious, an unconstitutional consequence
cannot be avoided by forcing upon the language of the act a meaning which, upon a
fair test, is repugnant to its terms."); G.A. ENDLICH, A CoMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF STATUTES § 180 (1888) (agreeing that the unconstitutionality canon does
not permit an interpretation that the statutory language cannot bear).
51 For decisions emphasizing that the unconstitutionality canon requires a court
to adopt a reading of the statute that is not the most obvious or natural, see Post Publ'g
Co., 137 F. at 725, French, 24 Cal. at 554, Townsend Gas &Elec. Co. v. Hil 64 P. 778, 780
(Wash. 1901), and Slack v. Jacobs, 8 W. Va. 612 (1875). As Judge Cooley explained:
The duty of the court to uphold a statute when the conflict between it and
the constitution is not dear, and the implication which must always exist that
no violation has been intended by the legislature, may require it in some
cases, where the meaning of the constitution is not in doubt, to lean in favor
of such a construction of the statute as might not at first view seem the most
obvious and natural.
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 255 (7th ed.
1903); accord BLACK, supra note 50, at 66-67 (agreeing that the unconstitutionality
canon authorizes a court "to disregard the natural and usual import of the words
used").
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different lengths to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation of a stat-
ute. Justice Story once wrote that a court should adopt a less obvious,
constitutional interpretation of a statute instead of an unconstitu-
tional, more obvious interpretation unless the unconstitutional inter-
pretation "is forced upon the Court by language altogether
unambiguous."52 Several decisions construed general statutory terms
narrowly to avoid holding the statute unconstitutional.53 Other deci-
sions rejected the literal meaning of statutory language in order to
achieve a constitutional interpretation. 54 Courts also read additional
provisions into a statute in order to sustain its constitutionality. 55
These are the very techniques that Schauer has criticized in the
context of the doubts canon. Schauer hypothesizes that the doubts
canon necessarily operates to displace the better interpretation of a
statute:
It is hard to imagine a case in which, constitutional considerations
aside, there would be two identically plausible interpretations, such
that, constitutional considerations again aside, the rational judge
would be reduced to something akin to tossing a coin. In almost
any case we can imagine, the constitution-free principles of statutory
interpretation will likely favor one result over another. And thus in
almost any case likely to arise, a constitutional or prudential princi-
ple directing courts to reach conclusions other than the ones they
would have reached absent that principle involves a cost measured
in the value of those considerations of policy and principle that gen-
erated what would otherwise have been the result.5 6
Thus, in Schauer's example of United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
57
all members of the Court agreed that the most natural reading of a
federal child pornography statute would not require a showing that a
52 United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 76 (1838).
53 See e.g., Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147, 153 (1872); Rutherford v.
Greene, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 196, 203 (1817); Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 27, 31-32
(1866); Townsend Gas & Elec. Co., 64 P. at 779-80.
54 See, e.g., Camp v. Rogers, 44 Conn. 291, 296-99 (1877) (applying the canon to
interpret "owner" to mean "driver"); Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376 (1857) (reading a
provision in a statute of limitations to not affect any available remedies); Clare v.
State, 68 Ind. 17 (1879) (concluding that a statutory reference to "section 74" was a
mistake); Palms, 21 N.W. at 79-80 (applying the unconstitutionality canon to a Wis-
consin statute defining county borders to follow the statute's intent, not its letter).
55 See, e.g., Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Glover, 110 S.W. 1031, 1033-34 (Ark.
1908) (applying the unconstitutionality canon to imply a statutory notice requirement
in order to satisfy due process); WestJersey Traction Co. v. Camden Horse R.R Co.,
29 A. 333 (NJ. Ch. 1894) (reading a corporate charter statute as if words creating an
exception had been included).
56 Schauer, supra note 7, at 83.
57 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
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defendant knew the age of the child, but a majority of the Court in-
voked the doubts canon to reject that interpretation and adopted an
interpretation including such a scienter requirement instead.58 That
approach requires a justification, but none of the possible explana-
tions are convincing to Schauer. He asserts that the doubts canon
cannot be based on an empirical claim that Congress seeks to avoid
enacting unconstitutional legislation, or on a congressional desire for
the Court to rewrite statutes if necessary, or on the judicial need to
respect the decisions of a coordinate branch of government.59 The
doubts canon involves the judicial rewriting of a statute, and Schauer
doubts that Congress finds that course less objectionable than the
constitutional decisions that the courts are trying to avoid. 60
Powerful though Schauer's criticisms are, they cannot simply be
transposed into the application of the unconstitutionality canon. Un-
like the doubts canon, the unconstitutionality canon does not depend
upon contested assumptions about the likelihood that the legislature
enacts legislation pressing near the boundaries of the Constitution.
Rather, the unconstitutionality canon depends upon the presumption
that the legislature has not actually violated the Constitution-that
the members of the legislature heed their oath to uphold the Consti-
tution, and that a coordinate branch of the government takes the
Constitution seriously. Such a separation of powers argument offers
greater support for the unconstitutionality canon than it does for the
doubts canon. While Schauer rightly questions whether Congress
would prefer judicial rewriting of a statute (via the doubts canon) to a
potentially fatal constitutional decision, Congress is more likely to
choose judicial rewriting (via the unconstitutionality canon) to noth-
ing at all. The doubts canon asks Congress not to take a risk; the
unconstitutionality canon allows Congress to salvage what it can. In
the latter case, faced with an ambiguous statute that can survive only if
it receives a second-best interpretation, the legislature might not even
see the application of the unconstitutionality canon as judicial
rewriting.
Moreover, this kind of argument was developed in many of the
nineteenth century cases that discussed the unconstitutionality canon.
58 See id. at 478 (opinion for the Court of Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 478 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). But see id. at 479-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For Schauer's discussion of
the case, see Schauer, supra note 7, at 74-81.
59 See Schauer, supra note 7, at 92-94.
60 Id. at 94-95.
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Courts sought to sustain a statute if possible. 61 They referred to the
legislature's duty to abide by the Constitution.62 Accordingly, courts
presumed that the legislature did not intend to violate the Constitu-
tion,63 or conversely, they refused to presume that the legislature in-
tended to violate the Constitution." As Judge Cooley put it, "the
court must construe the statute in accordance with the legislative in-
tent; since it is always presumed the legislature designed the statute to
take effect, and not to be a nullity."65 When this presumption con-
flicts with the statute's most natural reading, the unconstitutionality
canon teaches that the presumption prevails unless the statute is too
clear to permit another interpretation. The empirical basis for this
presumption is not beyond dispute, but it is much stronger than the
presumption underlying the doubts canon-that the legislature wants
to avoid unnecessary constitutional litigation.
But the greatest difference between the unconstitutionality canon
and the doubts canon concerns the way in which each rule treats
doubts about the constitutionality of a statute. The doubts canon sees
such doubts as a reason for adopting another interpretation of a stat-
ute. The courts applying the unconstitutionality canon in the nine-
teenth century responded to constitutional doubts in a much different
fashion. The existence of constitutional doubts provided a sufficient
61 See Wilburn & Co. v. McCalley, 63 Ala. 436, 444 (1879); Santo v. Iowa, 2 Iowa
165, 208 (1855); Portland & Willamette Valley R.R. Co. v. City of Portland, 12 P. 265,
266 (Or. 1886).
62 See, e.g., Cotton v. County Comm'rs, 6 Fla. 610, 616 (1856) (observing that the
legislature's "manifest duty is never to exercise a power of doubtful constitutionality");
see also Brown v. Buzan, 24 Ind. 194, 197 (1865) (asserting that "the judiciary ought to
accord to the legislature as much purity of purpose as it would claim for itself, as
honest a desire to obey the constitution, and, also, a high capacity to judge of its
meaning").
63 See, e.g., Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1884);
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1882); French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518,
554 (1864); Park v. Candler, 39 S.E. 89, 95 (Ga. 1901); Robson v. Doyle, 61 N.E. 435,
437 (l. 1901); Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 27, 31 (1866); NewJersey v. Haring, 26 A.
915 (NJ. 1893); Colwell v. The May's Landing Water Power Co., 14 NJ. Eq. 245, 249
(1868); Metropolitan Bd. of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657, 668 (1866); Armour & Co. v.
Western Constr. Co., 78 P. 1106, 1107 (Wash. 1905); Slack v.Jacobs, 8 W. Va. 612, 626
(1875).
64 See, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 269 (1886); United States v. Coombs,
37 U.S. 72, 76 (1838); Wilburn & Co., 63 Ala. at 444; Robson, 61 N.E. at 437; Middle-
port v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 82 111. 562, 566 (1876); McComas v. Krug, 81 Ind. 327, 332
(1882); Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322 (1867) (Cooley, J.); Atlantic City Water-Works
Co. v. Consumers' Water Co., 15 A. 581, 586 (N.J. Ch. 1888); New York & Oswego
Midland R.R. Co. v. Van Horn, 57 N.Y. 473, 477 (1874).
65 CooLtEY, supra note 51, at 255.
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basis for rejecting an argument that a statute was unconstitutional.
Statutes were presumed constitutional-often to the point that courts
demanded that the unconstitutionality of a statute be proved "beyond
a reasonable doubt."66 Therefore, if a court determined that an inter-
pretation of a statute simply raised doubts about its constitutionality,
the court abided by that interpretation and rejected the constitutional
challenge. 67
There were few exceptions to this approach before Delaware &
Hudson. The most unequivocal example of a court adopting a differ-
ent interpretation of a statute simply to avoid constitutional doubts
was Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission,68 decided just six
months before Delaware & Hudson and the only case cited in Delaware
& Hudson for the doubts canon. Harriman involved the ICC's author-
ity to compel testimony from the chairman of the Union Pacific Rail-
road concerning his ownership of stock in other railroads. The ICC
sought that testimony to learn whether additional legislation was
needed in light of such stock ownership, but the ICC did not have a
pending enforcement action against Harriman. Justice Holmes inter-
preted the statute establishing the ICC as authorizing only those inves-
tigations designed to uncover violations of the act. He did so because
of concerns-including constitutional concerns-about a broader in-
66 See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. DeBusk, 20 P. 752, 756 (Colo. 1888); Common-
wealth v. People's Five Cents Say. Bank, 87 Mass. 428, 432 (1862); Staudacher v.
Webb, 23 Hun. 42, 46 (N.Y. 1878); Ex parte McCollum, 1 Cow. 550, 564 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1823); Slack, 8 W. Va. at 625-26; see also Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466,
475 (1882) (declaring that unconstitutionality must be "clearly established"); Harris,
106 U.S. at 635 (holding that unconstitutionality must be "clearly demonstrated"); cf.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (asserting that "it
is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pro-
nounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void. The
opposition between the constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a
clear and strong conviction of their incompatability with each other"). But see County
of Cherokee v. Kansas, 13 P. 558 (Kan. 1887) (holding that unconstitutionality must
be demonstrated by the preponderance of the evidence). Professor Thayer is most
identified with the reasonable doubt approach. SeeJames B. Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. R V. 129, 144 (1893).
67 See Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666, 673 (1873);
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 531 (1870); French, 24 Cal. at 554-58; Cotton, 6 Fla. at
613-16; McComas, 81 Ind. at 331-334; Grinage v. Times-Democrat Publ'g Co., 31 So.
682, 683 (La. 1902); Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 39 N.E. 686, 687-89 (N.Y.
1895); Clarke v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 446, 470-71 (N.Y. 1857); Lowery v. Board
of Graded Sch. Trustees, 52 S.E. 267, 269-70 (N.C. 1905); see also Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 625 (1819) (noting that the
Court should not pronounce a statute unconstitutional in a doubtful case).
68 211 U.S. 407 (1908).
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terpretation of the statute, and notwithstanding the ICC's specific stat-
utory authority to make any necessary recommendations to Congress
regarding the need for additional legislation. Then, in the last sen-
tence of his opinion, he added that "[i]f we felt more hesitation than
we do, we still should feel bound to construe the statute not merely so
as to sustain its constitutionality, but so as to avoid a succession of
constitutional doubts, so far as candor admits."69 This is the first di-
rect statement of the doubts canon. It suffers, however, from a
number of problems: it was probably dicta, it cited a precedent that
stated but misapplied the unconstitutionality canon,70 the resulting
interpretation prompted three justices to dissent,7' and it failed to of-
fer any explanation for the departure from the historic application of
the unconstitutionality canon and the disregard of constitutional
doubts.
Besides Harriman, only one other case can be counted as defi-
nitely relying on the doubts canon.72 The hints of the doubts canon
in the nineteenth century cases are more ambiguous. Two cases sug-
gested that constitutional doubts alone might justify a different inter-
pretation, but it is not clear that they followed that course.73 Several
cases seem to have left the constitutional question undecided, but
again, the decisions are hardly emphatic that constitutional doubts
69 Id. at 422.
70 In Knights Templars' &Masons'Lifelndemnity Co. v.Jarman, 187 U.S. 197 (1902),
the court avoided the retroactive application of a Missouri insurance statute. The
court stated the unconstitutionality canon-"where the language of an act will bear two
interpretations, equally obvious, that one which is clearly in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Constitution is to be preferred"-but it relied instead on the "doubtful-
ness" of the constitutionality of a retroactivity question and specifically declined to
decide that question. Id. at 205.
71 See Harriman, 211 U.S. at 423-29 (Day, J., joined by Harlan & McKenna, JJ.,
dissenting) (objecting that the majority's interpretation of the statutory power of the
Interstate Commerce Commission was too narrow). Justice Moody did not participate
in the case, see id. at 422, soJustice Holmes gained a bare majority of five votes for his
opinion.
72 See McNalley v. Field, 119 F. 445, 447-48 (C.C.D.R.I. 1902) (interpreting an
amendment to a Spanish-American War revenue statute in order to avoid deciding
whether Congress has the constitutional power to tax the governmental instrumental-
ity of a state).
73 See Camp v. Rogers, 44 Conn. 291, 298 (1877) (stating that "[i]f upon the con-
struction we have been considering the law in question would be void, or even of doubt-
ful validity, it is our duty to find, if we are able, some other construction that will
relieve it of this difficulty") (emphasis added); Clare v. State, 68 Ind. 17, 25 (1879)
(observing that a literal construction "might perhaps" make the statute unconstitu-
tional while a liberal construction "would remove all doubts").
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suffice to require a different interpretation. 74 With hindsight, these
ambiguous statements may have presaged the announcement of the
doubts canon in Delaware & Hudson, but the balance of the nine-
teenth century cases left little doubt that the unconstitutionality ca-
non remained securely in place.
II. THE CHOICE OF CANONS IN Ds LAwARE &HIUDSON
The differences between the unconstitutionality canon and the
doubts canon can be illustrated by considering how each canon oper-
ated in Delaware & Hudson itself. Congress enacted the Hepburn Act
in 1906. Section one of the Act-the Commodities Clause-provided:
From and after May first, nineteen hundred and eight, it shall be
unlawful for any railroad company to transport from any State, Ter-
ritory, or the District of Columbia, to any other State, Territory or
the District of Columbia, or to any foreign country, any article or
commodity, other than timber and the manufactured products
thereof, manufactured, mined, or produced by it, or under its au-
thority, or which it may own in whole, or in part, or in which it may
have any interest direct or indirect except such articles or commodi-
ties as may be necessary and intended for its use in the conduct of
its business as a common carrier.75
The Commodities Clause responded to the existing situation in which
a handful of Pennsylvania railroads shipped most of the anthracite
coal produced and used in the United States. Consistent with Penn-
sylvania state policy, these railroads owned an interest in the coal that
74 See Knights Templars', 187 U.S. at 205 (stating the unconstitutionality canon but
declining to decide the constitutional question); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
433, 448 (1830) (stating the unconstitutionality canon but reading a statute governing
federal court proceedings in Louisiana to avoid "the most serious doubts" about the
statute's constitutionality); People v. Frisbie, 26 Cal. 135, 139 (1864) (opining that the
statute would be "difficult, if not impossible" to sustain under one interpretation);
Commonwealth v. Downes, 40 Mass. 227, 229-32 (1836) (refusing to interpret a fed-
eral statute to authorize the enlistment of minors in the military without the consent
of their parents because Congress had not clearly stated such an intention in the
statute); Atlantic City Water-Works Co. v. Consumers' Water Co., 15 A. 581, 586 (N.J.
Ch. 1888) (indicating that the constitutionality of a statute would be in doubt under
one interpretation, but earlier stating that the constitutional conclusion "would seem
to be so clear as to be beyond all dispute"); Palms v. Shawano Co., 21 N.W. 77, 80
(Wis. 1884) (deciding to avoid an interpretation that "might" be unconstitutional); cf.
In reAbbey Press, 134 F. 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1904) (describing argument of counsel that a
provision in a bankruptcy statute is "unconstitutional, or at least so inconsistent with
the fundamental law that no doubtful language should be construed to include such
[constitutionally problematic] authority").
75 Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
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they shipped, so that other railroads were unable to compete for the
business of transporting the vast amount of coal mined in Penn-
sylvania.v6 For example, the Delaware and Hudson Company mined
coal from its own lands and owned the stock of several coal compa-
nies, so that "much the greater part of the coal shipped over the rail-
road [was] the product of its own mines."77 Congress sought to
abolish simultaneous ownership of coal and the means of transporting
coal by enacting the Commodities Clause.
The Pennsylvania railroads, of course, objected. Some of them
structured their ownership interests so that they would fall outside the
Commodities Clause; other railroads "fully expected the clause to be
declared unconstitutional, and took no steps to dispose of their hold-
ings."78 Thus, when Attorney General Bonaparte sued the railroads to
obtain compliance with the Clause, the railroads argued that the
Clause exceeded the congressional commerce clause power and that
it violated due process. The circuit court agreed in a 2-1 decision.7 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court identified a series of "grave consti-
tutional questions" raised by the government's interpretation of the
statute as banning all railroad ownership of coal that they ship.80
76 See United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 164 F. 215, 224 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1908) (recounting the events that led to the enactment of the Commodities Clause).
For other accounts of the history of the Commodities Clause, see FRANK HAIGH
DIXON, RAILROADS AND GOVERNMENT: THEIm RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1910-1921, at 55 (1922); ROBERT B. HIGHSAW, EDwARD DOUGLASS WHITE: DEFENDER
OF THE CONSERVATIVE FAITH 105 (1981); EUOTJONES, THE ANTHRACITE COAL COMBI-
NATION IN THE UNITED STATES 187-93 (1914). The best description of the develop-
ment of the Pennsylvania coal mining industry and its relationship to the railroads is
contained in JONES, supra, at 3-179, and in United States v. Reading Co., 226 F. 229,
232-39 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
77 JONES, supra note 76, at 129.
78 GABRIEL KoLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877-1916, at 163 (1965); accord
JONES, supra note 76, at 195 (noting that "practically no effort was made by the princi-
pal coal roads to comply with the law" because of their heavy mortgage debt on coal
lands and "because it was believed that the commodity clause would be held by the
courts to be unconstitutional"). Indeed, the Justice Department agreed not to prose-
cute railroads for violating the Commodities Clause pending ajudicial determination
of its constitutionality, provided that the railroads agreed to abide by that decision.
See id. at 196 (citing 42 CONG. REc. 5331 (1908), and 42 CONG. REc. 5533 (1908)).
79 See Delaware & Hudson, 164 F. at 226-49 (Gray, J.); id. at 249-51 (Dallas, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the statute "is incompatible with free government").
But see id. at 251-59 (Buffington,J., dissenting) (defending the constitutionality of the
statute).
80 United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 406 (1909). The Court
described the government's interpretation of the statute as
prohibit[ing] railroad companies from transporting in interstate commerce
articles or commodities other than the excepted class, which have been man-
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These questions included whether the Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to regulate an article that might become involved in inter-
state commerce, whether the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress
to prohibit a railroad from shipping an article that it has previously
owned, whether traditional state power to authorize a corporation to
produce and ship a commodity was displaced by the Commerce
Clause, and whether past congressional approval of such practices af-
fected their constitutionality.81 Instead of deciding any of those ques-
tions, the Court announced the doubts canon and interpreted the
Commodities Clause in a more narrow fashion that avoided those con-
stitutional objections. But constitutional concerns were not the only
basis for the Court's approach. The Court suggested that a literal
reading of the statute produced internal inconsistencies that required
the Court to harmonize the provisions.82 Additionally, the Court in-
terpreted the direct or indirect interests in an article, that were pro-
hibited by the Commodities Clause, as not encompassing railroad
ownership of a coal company's stock.83 Thus, the Commodities
Clause escaped the Court meaning that railroads were prohibited
from shipping coal that (1) the railroad had produced and had not in
good faith sold before transportation, (2) the railroad owned in whole
or in part, or (3) the railroad had some legal or equitable interest in
other than stock.84
ufactured, mined or produced by them or under their authority, or which
they own or may have owned in whole or in part, or in which they have or
may have had any interest, direct or indirect. These prohibitions, it is fur-
ther insisted, apply to the transportation by a railroad company in interstate
commerce of a commodity which has been manufactured, mined or pro-
duced by a corporation, in which the transporting railroad company is a
stockholder, irrespective of the extent of such stock ownership.
Id. at 404; see also id. at 405 (quoting the government as arguing that "[tihis is un-
doubtedly a searching and radical law, and was meant to be so").
81 Id. at 406-07.
82 Id. at 408-12.
83 Id. at 413-14. The Court defended this reading as consistent with the Senate's
refusal to amend the Commodities Clause to specifically prohibit railroad ownership
of coal company stock. Id. at 414 (citing 40 CONG. REc. 7012-14 (1906)).
84 Id. at 415. In the Court's words, the Commodities Clause prohibited
a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce from transporting in
such commerce articles or commodities under the following circumstances
and conditions: (a) When the article or commodity has been manufactured,
mined or produced by a carrier or under its authority, and at the time of
transportation the carrier has not in good faith before the act of transporta-
tion dissociated itself from such article or commodity, (b) When the carrier
owns the article or commodity to be transported in whole or in part; (c)
When the carrier at the time of transportation has an interest, direct or indi-
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This debut of the doubts canon proved to be less than auspicious.
Justice Harlan dissented from the Court's opinion because he feared
that it would allow railroads to arrange their affairs in a way that
avoided the congressional intent to distinguish railroads from the coal
that they shipped.85 The railroads quickly fulfilled Justice Harlan's
prediction. The Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad estab-
lished a separate coal company to which the railroad sold its coal at
the mouth of the mine. The Lehigh Valley Railroad organized a simi-
lar company that bought the coal from the railroad and then con-
tracted with the railroad for its shipment. The Reading Railway
maintained its existing structure as part of a corporation that owned
both the railroad and the coal company.8 6 The lower courts inter-
preted Delaware & Hudson as permitting these new arrangements even
though they threatened to defeat the original congressional purpose
in enacting the Commodities Clause.87 The Supreme Court, however,
reversed each decision and held that the corporate structures violated
the Commodities Clause. 8 The Court's opinions treated the Com-
modities Clause much differently than had Delaware & Hudson. In
United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co.,89 the
rect, in a legal or equitable sense in the article or commodity, not including,
therefore, articles or commodities manufactured, mined, produced or
owned, etc., by a bona fide corporation in which the railroad company is a
stockholder.
Id.
85 Id. at 419 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also DIXON, supra note 76, at 55 (asserting
that "[n]o more helpful guidance could have been offered by expert counsel to those
companies that were seeking a way around the law").
86 The post-Delaware & Hudson activities are described in ROBERT J. CASEY &
WA.S. DOUGLAS, THE LACKAWANNA STORY 145-47 (1951); DIXON, supra note 76, at
56-58;JoNFs, supra note 76, at 201-12; Note, Interpretation of the Commodities Clause of
the Act of Congress Regulating Railroads, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 66, 67-70 (1920).
87 See United States v. Reading Co., 226 F. 229, 276 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (concluding
that "the plan now assailed by the government cannot be successfully attacked for lack
of good faith; we regard it as an honest attempt to cope with a perplexing financial
situation ... and an attempt to solve difficult legal problems with scrupulous regard
for the law"); United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 225 F. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1914);
United States v, Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 213 F. 240, 260 (D.N.J. 1914)
(observing that "the transactions between the [railroad and coal] companies began
and have been carried on in good faith, in obedience to the decisions of the Supreme
Court and in reliance thereon"); see also Ketchum v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co.,
248 F. 106 (8th Cir. 1917) (holding that a private party lacked standing to raise a
Commodities Clause claim).
88 See United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Delaware,
Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 238 U.S. 516 (1915); United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R.
Co., 220 U.S. 257 (1910).
89 238 U.S. 516 (1914).
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Court explained that while the corporate relationships did not actu-
ally constitute a monopoly, the monopolistic tendencies of those rela-
tionships were "opposed to that policy of the law, which was the
underlying reason for the adoption of the Commodities Clause."90
Then in United States v. Reading Co.,91 the Court emphasized that the
corporate structure was within the evil to be remedied by Congress
when it enacted the Commodities Clause and decided that the rail-
road exercised the requisite authority over the coal "without splitting
hairs as to where the naked title to the coal would be when in
transit."92 The remedial approach followed in these cases is a far cry
from the narrow interpretation announced in Delaware & Hudson. In-
deed, eleven years after the Court decided Delaware & Hudson, the
Commodities Clause regained the meaning that the government had
originally advanced. 93
And it did so without revisiting the constitutional questions left
undecided in Delaware & Hudson. The attorney representing the rail-
road in the first case decided after Delaware & Hudson argued that a
broader reading of the Commodities Clause would raise the Com-
merce Clause and due process questions, 94 but the Court refused to
consider those constitutional questions in that case or any of the ensu-
ing cases. By 1920, the Court had adopted the original meaning of
the Commodities Clause without ever explaining why the serious con-
stitutional questions raised by that meaning somehow disappeared.
90 Id. at 533; see also Tap Line Cases, 234 U.S. 1, 27 (1914) (explaining that the
purpose of the Commodities Clause was "to divorce transportation from production
and manufacture and to make transporation a business of an by itself unallied with
the manufacture and production in which a carrier was itself interested").
91 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
92 Id. at 60-61. ChiefJustice White, the author of Delaware &Hudson, would have
upheld the corporate structure for the reasons stated in the district court's opinion.
Id. at 64-65 (White, CJ., joined by Holmes & Van Devanter, JJ., dissenting).
93 As one contemporary observer wrote: "In the Reading Company case the
Supreme Court has clearly departed from its position taken in the Delaware and Hud-
son case and the basis of its decision is the underlying policy of the clause." Note,
supra note 86, at 69-70.
94 In United States v. Lehigh Valley PR. Co., John G. Johnson, counsel for the rail-
road, argued:
The relationship which the Government now seeks to have declared so lack-
ing in good faith as to render the existence of the coal company a mere
fiction, forms the basis of the very rights from which arose the grave and
doubtful constitutional questions which this court found it unnecessary to
decide.
220 U.S. 257, 262 (1910); cf. JONES, supra note 76, at 198 n.5 (writing-in 1914-that
the constitutional questions left undecided in Delaware & Hudson "presumably will
come up again before the Supreme Court for final determination").
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The invocation of the doubts canon in Delaware & Hudson also
resulted in an interpretation of the statute that remained subject to
constitutional challenge. Once the Court adopted its construction of
the Commodities Clause, it then spent three pages explaining why the
Commerce Clause and due process objections to that construction
were unavailing. Those constitutional arguments troubled the Court
far less than the constitutional questions posed by the government's
broader understanding of the statute, but the complete invalidation
of the provision by the lower court shows that the Court's interpreta-
tion of the statute failed to achieve its stated goal of avoiding "grave
and doubtful" constitutional questions.
By contrast, if the Court had employed the unconstitutionality ca-
non in Delaware & Hudson, then it would have resolved the constitu-
tional issues at an earlier date and avoided several years of futile
railroad efforts to restructure their corporate relations in an effort to
comply with Delaware & Hudson. If the Court had decided that the
government's reading of the Commodities Clause was constitutional,
then the Court would have adopted an interpretation that effectuated
congressional intent, too. The only danger created by the unconstitu-
tionality canon is that it could have provoked the Court to follow the
lower court's lead in holding the government's interpretation of the
Commodities Clause unconstitutional. Had it done so, then the un-
constitutionality canon would have allowed the Court to adopt the
narrower interpretation of the clause-the interpretation that the
Court actually announced in Delaware & Hudson because of the
doubts canon-so that the law would have survived, albeit in a trun-
cated form.
It is impossible to say in 1997 how the Court would have decided
the constitutionality of the Commodities Clause in 1909. The Court's
invalidation of broad economic legislation as contrary to the Due Pro-
cess Clause had already reached its zenith by that date,95 and there
was some indication of a greater willingness to uphold such statutes.96
On the other hand, the Court continued to strike down federal eco-
nomic legislation during the years that the Court revived the original
understanding of the Commodities Clause. 97 We can only speculate
95 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
96 See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding an Oregon statute
regulating the number of hours that women were allowed to work). See generallyJoHN
E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 378 & n.26 (5th ed. 1995)
(noting that between 1900 and 1910 the Supreme Court usually sustained federal
statutes expanding the power of the ICC).
97 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal child
labor statute as beyond the congressional commerce clause power).
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about how the Court would have resolved the constitutional issues
raised in Delaware & Hudson if the Court had been forced to decide
them. But this much is certain: the unconstitutionality canon would
have required the Court to actually decide the constitutionality of the
government's reading of the Commodities Clause before rejecting
that reading in favor of the less obvious reading that the Court in fact
adopted. Instead, the Court used the doubts canon to cast aside the
best reading of the statute, only to later return to that reading without
ever answering the constitutional questions.
III. CONCLUSION
Delaware & Hudson was wrong to insist that the doubts canon is
the only tool available to a court confronted with an ambiguous stat-
ute and a constitutional problem. The unconstitutionality canon
presented a viable alternative throughout the nineteenth century.
That does not mean, however, that those were the good old days. The
unconstitutionality canon smacks of an advisory opinion by answering
a constitutional question only so that the constitutional holding can
be avoided and it demands a resolution of constitutional questions
that the courts may be just as happy to leave unresolved. These con-
cerns may justify the modern focus on the doubts canon instead of the
unconstitutionality canon. But now that Professor Schauer has ques-
tioned the doubts canon, any helpful alternative may find a receptive
audience. Or maybe there is a way to reconfigure both canons into an
integrated whole. These are difficult questions that I leave for an-
other day. Meanwhile, Justice White's claim that the historic state-
ment of the unconstitutionality canon "plainly must mean" the doubts
canon instead can no longer survive. If we are going to heed
Schauer's advice to reexamine Ashwander, we should probably reexam-
ine Delaware & Hudson, too.
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